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1.

Introduction

On October 23 2014, EU countries agreed on a 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy, which sets new
and challenging targets for the European Union post-2020. The European Council endorsed three targets,
with one being a binding commitment to improve energy efficiency by at least 27 percent by the year 2030.
On 30 November 2016, the Commission proposed an update to the Energy Efficiency Directive, which
reviews the energy efficiency target to be reached by 2030 to a binding 30% EU level and delivers a list of
measures to ensure that the new target is met.
Energy efficiency can deliver a wide range of benefits to the economy and society. Improving energy
efficiency results in lower greenhouse gas emissions, in a more competitive, secure and sustainable energy
system. Moreover, at the household and firm levels, it allows cutting energy bills, implying higher
disposable income and improved competitiveness. To improve energy efficiency, regulatory approaches,
economic instruments and information measures have been extensively applied, along with substantial
public resources being invested in research and development for energy-efficient technologies.
However, the ability to increase energy efficiency depends not only on the availability of cheap
technologies or on policy interventions, but to a large extent also on the behavioural choices of users. The
evidence is that agents underinvest in energy-efficient technologies with adoption rate of households and
firms being too low. The concept of “private energy-efficiency gap” also called “energy paradox” describes
precisely the fact that some energy-efficient technologies are not adopted despite the savings they entail
(Gerarden et al., 2017). 1 The low level of investment in energy efficiency technologies translates into high
implicit discount rates. A discount rate reflects the trade-off between upfront capital costs and operating
costs that occurs over a longer period and it is an indication of how consumers value future benefits from
current investments.
The existing literature has largely searched the explanations for such underinvestment and
correlated high implicit discount rates (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). By reviewing all the existing empirical
evidence, the current paper provides a correlation between the different barriers to energy efficiency and
consumer behaviour related to two domains. The first domain is behaviour related to energy curtailment,
which represents routine, repetitive effort to decrease consumption on a day-to-day basis. The second is
behaviour related to investments, which are one time actions such as purchasing new energy efficiency
technologies and modifying a building or house.
While some types of barriers are well known and their implications for energy efficiency
documented, barriers that pertain to preferences and irrational behaviour are less studied. A full
understanding of the exact impacts of the latter on energy efficiency is still limited (Gillingham et al., 2009).
The paper also assesses the effectiveness of the different policy interventions and programs in addressing
1

The notion of energy efficiency gap can be defined relative to social optima as well. In this case it is called “social
energy-efficiency gap” and refers to the apparent reality that some energy-efficiency technologies are not adopted
even though they are socially efficient.
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the different barriers. In particular, it investigates the efficacy of the existing “nudges” approaches, which
are low cost motivational and persuasion strategies. Finally, the paper reviews the penetration of
behavioural sciences principles into this type of programs. This paper is one of the first that combines in a
unified framework the main findings of different disciplines, from economics to psychology.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical evidence of the
impact of the barriers on adoption and energy use. Section 3 describes the different policies available in the
energy efficiency domain and discusses their relevance in addressing the barriers to energy efficiency.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Empirical evidence of the impact of barriers on behaviour
Various barriers to the adoption of energy efficiency technologies have been identified and many
taxonomies made. Schleich et al. (2016) provide a framework that describes the different factors
underlying the (high) implicit discount rates. 2 These factors, which have been classified as internal and
external barriers, explain the low adoption behaviour in the domain of energy efficiency. Internal barriers
have to do with factors that cannot be changed or are difficult to change, because they relate to
preferences and behaviour. On the contrary, external barriers cover factors that can be more easily
changed. 3 I apply the same framework throughout this paper, because of its clarity and completeness.
Moreover, the same type of barriers are found to influence both investment and energy use.
2.1 Internal barriers and adoption or energy use
According to Schleich et al. (2016), internal barriers to energy efficiency are related to preferences
and predictable (ir)rational behaviour. These factors are labelled “behavioural explanations” for the energy
efficiency gap in the taxonomy provided by Gerarden et al. (2017).
Benefits and costs of an investment vary across agents and if an investment is profitable for one, it
may not be so for a different consumer. The heterogeneity of the agents plays a great role in explaining the
variation in energy efficient behaviour as individuals differ in their time, risk and pro-environmental
preferences (Table 1).
2.1.1 Preferences
Time preferences are reflected in time discounting, namely how the consumers value the future relative to
the present. Time preferences describe the level of (im)patience of an individual, her present or future
orientation. Traditional theories of discounting posit that individuals care less about the future than the
present and for this reason they are labelled present-oriented. In the context of energy efficient choices,

2

See also Gerarden et al. (2017) for a similar taxonomy.
The idea that people underinvest in energy efficient technologies derives from the use of engineering and economic
models. Model and measurement errors might create a discrepancy between theoretical predictions and the actual
adoption of energy-saving technology and they can ultimately cause an overestimation of the magnitude of the
energy-efficiency gap. This implies that in some taxonomies, these errors are treated as a third explanation for the
energy efficiency gap (Gerarden et al., 2017) .
3
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persons with higher discount rates are expected to be less willing to carry out energy-saving investments,
because they devalue rapidly future rewards, expressed in terms of energy savings.
Table 1: Internal Barriers to energy efficiency
Internal Barriers
Preferences
Time Preferences

(Ir)rational behaviour
Reference-dependence and
weighting
Risk Preferences
Rational Inattention
Environmental Preferences
Bounded Rationality
Present bias and myopia
Status Quo Bias
Source: Schleich et al. (2016) and Frederiks et al. (2015)

non-linear

probability

The literature has typically elicited time preferences from actual energy-saving behaviour. Only few
studies measure individual discount rates first from stated behaviour, and only then correlate these
discount rates to investment and consumption behaviour related to energy efficiency. Newell and Siikamäki
(2015) is one of these. They set up a choice experiment and use alternative product models and different
labelling treatments to elicit individual discount rates. They confirm that impatient individuals, those with
higher discount rates, attach a lower value to the operating cost savings of an energy efficient appliance
which occur in the future. Liebermann and Ungar (1997; 2002) apply a similar framework and conclude that
people with lower discount rates tend to select more energy-efficient and initially more expensive airconditioning systems, while people with higher discount rates tend to prefer cheaper and less energyefficient devices. Bradford et al. (2014) find that more patient individuals are more likely to have installed
energy-efficient lighting and use less air conditioning in summer. Fischbacher et al. (2015) find that time
preferences do not influence investment in renovation but are related to energy use behaviour. In
particular, more future-oriented homeowners consume less energy. Bruderer Enzler et al. (2014) relate
discount rates to various energy saving behaviours. They find mixed results, with low discount rates being
correlated with only some of the behaviours considered.
Given that some degree of uncertainty surrounds the benefits of an energy efficiency investment,
due to uncertain prospects of future cost savings or uncertain technology performance, preferences
related to risk are another internal barrier typically influencing investments. 4 Risk preferences vary among
individuals, but, most importantly, the same person can change her love and aversion for risk, depending
on what is at stake. People tend to be less risk averse for low-stakes than for large-stakes gambles. This
behaviour is known as the ‘peanuts effect’ (Weber and Chapman, 2005). The literature documents that
more risk averse agents are less willing to adopt energy efficient appliances. Qiu et al. (2014) apply the
same two-step approach described above, whereby risk preferences are first elicited through hypothetical
4

Interestingly, there is a correlation between risk and time preferences. Typically, high risk aversion is associated with
low discounting (Sutter et al., 2013; Rodriguez-Lara and Ponti, 2017).
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lottery choices and then correlated to some self-reported investment in energy efficient appliances and
retrofitting technologies. They find that more risk averse consumers are less likely to retrofit their homes or
purchase energy efficient appliances. Fischbacher et al. (2015) elicit risk attitudes using an experimentallyvalidated risk questionnaire and confirm larger renovations among more risk takers. Erdem et al. (2010)
measure risk attitude through a self-assessment approach rather than through an experimental design, and
find that more risk-seeking consumers are more likely to pay a premium for hybrid automobiles. Through a
choice-experiment, Farsi (2010) analyses consumers’ preferences for energy saving systems and how they
are influenced by risk. The author concludes that risk attitude affects consumers’ behaviour regarding
enhanced insulation and ventilation.
Pro-environmental preferences are a third factor affecting behaviour in the energy domain. Some
people may decide to purchase energy efficient appliances or curtail energy use, even though these
decisions are associated with higher (monetary and non-monetary) costs in the short run. People may
choose to act pro-environmentally because they want to protect the environment and value environmental
quality more than their personal comfort. Values are antecedents of environmental preferences,
intentions, and behaviour and guide principles in everyone’s life (Schwartz, 1992). They are important
drivers of actions, with some values limiting pro-environmental actions and others promoting them (Dunlap
et al., 1983). Individuals endorse four different values: hedonic, egoistic, altruistic and biospheric (Steg and
De Groot, 2012).
While altruistic and biospheric values are positively correlated with pro-environmental behaviour,
hedonic and egoistic values constrain pro-environmental behaviours (Steg et al., 2014). Persons who
strongly endorse altruistic values adopt behaviours based on other people’s perceived costs and benefits. A
person with strong biospheric values considers the costs and benefits with respect to the nature and the
environment. Biospheric values are strong predictors of environmental behaviour, because people who
strongly endorse biospheric values are more likely to engage in various pro-environmental behaviours (de
Groot and Steg, 2008).
Persons with strong egoistic values adopt a behaviour taking into consideration their own
resources. They act pro-environmentally only if the pro-environmental option proves to be the cheapest for
themselves. Persons with strong hedonic values are highly concerned with improving own feelings and
reducing personal effort. They may not undertake a profitable investment or curtail consumption, if these
are too costly in terms of personal comfort. Egoistic and hedonic values typically limit pro environmental
behaviours, because of the trade-offs between resources/comfort and the environment.
Individuals typically endorse all four values, but substantial differences exist in the extent to which
different individuals endorse specific values. This translates into heterogeneity in the population in terms of
pro-environmental preferences.

5
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2018

7

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1233 [2018]

A growing number of empirical studies have analysed if environmental preferences explain
consumer behaviour in energy efficiency. The evidence is mixed for two reasons. First, because different
approaches have been used to elicit preferences, with some papers measuring environmental preferences
through attitudes and other papers through effective behaviour. Second, because papers measure different
types of energy efficient behaviour. Some behaviours are more difficult and demanding than others, and
some behaviours are private rather than visible.
There are a number of papers that find a positive correlation between energy efficiency and proenvironmental attitudes, measured through stated preferences. For example, Fischbacher et al. (2015) find
that among renovators, persons with strong pro-environmental preferences own houses with higher
window, roof and façade quality. Moreover, environmentally friendly homeowners display lower energy
consumption. Di Maria et al. (2010) find that environmentalists are more likely to use energy-efficient light
bulbs. Environmentalists are also more likely to participate in green-electricity programs (Kotchen and
Moore, 2007; 2008), sign up for a carbon offsetting program (Harding and Rapson, 2017), implement
electricity saving activities (Ek and Söderholm, 2010) and choose the most sustainable though most
expensive products (van der Werff, et al., 2013).
On the contrary, studies that measure environmental preference through actual behaviour find an
opposite result. Lange et al. (2014) find that only environmental behaviour is correlated with environmentfriendly heating, while attitudes and perceptions are not. Similarly, Ramos et al. (2016) report that ecofriendly behaviours, elicited from environmental policy activism and recycling actions, are positively
correlated with both energy efficiency investments in the dwelling and daily energy-saving habits. On the
contrary, environmental attitudes are not. The authors notice that measures of environmental attitudes
elicited through stated preferences may not reflect true environmental preferences because of
‘compliance/social desirability bias’. This bias arises when respondents tend to manifest a higher propensity
to be pro-environment due to the influence of social norms. This may explain why these last papers find
that pro-environmental attitudes do not translate into actual investment in energy efficiency or energysaving actions.
The second reason for a mixed evidence is due to the different types of energy efficient behaviour
considered. Some actions, such as energy consumption or household temperature choice, are private
information, which are unobserved by other people such as neighbours. Other actions, such as investment
in solar panel or purchase of hybrid cars are visible to others. In the case of green conspicuous products,
the investment may be undertaken because of prestige and not by the desire to behave proenvironmentally. The adoption of green products is believed to enhance social status, particularly when it is
costly, as it signals to others the availability of sufficient resources to make altruistic sacrifices (Griskevicius
et al. , 2010). This evidence has been largely confirmed in the case of green cars and solar panels ( Kahn
2007; Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012).
6
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Moreover, Sexton and Sexton (2014) find that consumption of conspicuous green products confers
social status that is higher, the greater the strength of environmental preferences of one’s peers. In this
case, social approval rather than strong biospheric values may drive the environmental behaviour. Social
aspects are important in the context of energy-efficient choices. Social norms convey guidelines and
implicit rules regarding what is common or desirable within a group or society (Cialdini and Trost, 1998).
Environmental preferences can be influenced by the willingness to conform to pro-environmental social
norms, because people tend to do what is socially approved. This consideration has important policy
implications. First, the use of messages that prime and appeal to identities, values and social norms, can
lever environmental preferences and prompt a pro-environmental behaviour. Second, it provides a guide
to policy makers in the selection of products for subsidies. Policies should target investments that are less
conspicuous in place of those that confer a status benefit.
2.1.2 (Ir)rational behaviour
Behavioural economics has drawn attention to numerous cases where individuals behave
differently from the expectations of the neoclassical economic theories. Consumer behaviour is complex
and rarely consistent with the assumption of fully rational agents. It should be noted that behavioural
economics amends rather than rejects the traditional economic assumptions. For example, behavioural
economics assumes that people try to choose their best feasible option, and this is simply a variant of the
optimization assumption (Laibson and List, 2015). For this reason, rather than labelling these behaviours as
failures, it is now common to refer to “behavioural explanations” for the energy efficiency gap (Gerarden et
al., 2017).
In the taxonomy provided by Schleich et al. (2016) these behavioural explanations are called
(ir)rational behaviour. Many behavioural explanations exist, but the most powerful and pervasive ones to
influence energy usage and investment are: 1. Reference-dependence and non-linear probability weighting;
2. Rational inattention; 3. Bounded rationality; 4. Present bias and myopia; 5. Status quo bias (Table 1).
Research in psychology has recognized that people tend to strongly prefer avoiding losses to
achieving gains and therefore weight losses more heavily than equal-sized gains. This implies that simply
framing a decision as a choice between losses rather than a choice between gains can reverse preferences,
everything else equal (Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007). This phenomenon is called loss aversion or
reference dependence because individuals evaluate the benefits and costs of a decision relative to a
reference point. This insight has been formalized in the prospect theory of decision making, which was
developed to explain some of the observed violations of the expected utility theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). Another behaviour formalized by the prospect theory is that people tend to over-weight
small probabilities and under-weight moderate and large probabilities so that they end up using non-linear
probability weighting. While in expected utility theory the shape of the utility function is influenced by risk
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aversion only, in prospect theory it is jointly determined by risk aversion, loss aversion and non-linear
probability weighting.
Loss aversion, reference dependence and non-linear probability weighting have implications for
energy efficient choices, in particular in the context of energy use. For example, Harding and Hsiaw (2014)
analyse individual behaviour with respect to a non-binding goal setting program, aimed at reducing energy
consumption. They find support for the presence of reference-dependent preferences. Moreover, they find
that individuals with reference-dependent preferences tend to reduce energy use once enrolled in the goal
setting program. This is because the goal acts as a reference point, and people derive utility directly from
comparing their consumption against this goal.
Rational inattention is another behavioural constraint to energy efficiency. Consumers have limited
attention and this may contribute to systematically underweight certain information or product attributes,
in particular those that are less salient. Given that consumers are less attentive to operating costs
compared to purchase prices, rational inattention can lead to low investment in energy efficient products.
Allcott (2011a) confirms that vehicle buyers make their decisions without considering fuel costs. Busse et al.
(2013) and Allcott and Wozny (2014) report that consumers tend to undervalue changes in expected future
energy costs, despite the undervaluation is not large. Sallee et al. (2016), on the contrary, report that future
fuel costs are not undervalued. Rational inattention may also have an impact on energy conservation.
Cohen et al. (2017) find that consumers underestimate future energy savings by 35%. Because of this
underestimation they increase energy use.
It should be noted that the use of limited attention when choosing among different durable goods
could be the result of a rational choice. A proper valuation of energy efficiency requires time and effort
which may not be justified when consumers have strong preferences regarding other product attributes
(Sallee, 2014).
People face cognitive constraints and limitations because of bounded rationality. There are limits
in human capacity to process and evaluate information. Therefore in complex situations, characterized for
example by an overload of information, people rely on a simple counting heuristic and rules of thumb.
These short-cuts help simplifying the decision-making process. When people are overwhelmed by
complexity, they tend to satisfice rather than optimize (Simon, 1955). By satisficing, the required effort is
reduced. In this respect, the apparent irrational behaviour could derive not from too little information, but
from people being unable to process all available information, because of cognitive constraints.
Another heuristic is the use of trust in decision-making (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003).
Trustworthiness is driven by competence-based attributes of peers, such as apparent expertise and
experience, and integrity-based attributes, such as perceived openness, honesty, and concern for others.
Camilleri and Larrick (2014) find that, given bounded rationality, the decision making is less effortful
if the problem representation matches the problem-solving processes. For example, information on fuel
8
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consumption rather than fuel costs and the use of a more comprehensive mileage scale increase
preferences toward fuel efficient vehicles. Ungemach et al. (2017) confirm that people often apply simple
heuristics when choosing between cars and they are influenced by highly correlated attributes, rather than
their meaning. Providing multiple translations of energy efficiency metrics could help guiding behaviour.
Present bias and myopia are other behavioural explanations for the energy efficiency gap. Present
bias refers to a situation where a discount rate is not constant and changes over time. 5 A constant rate of
discounting allows for consistent intertemporal decisions. However, behavioural economics and psychology
reject the assumption that agents have a constant rate of discounting. Individuals appear to discount the
future at a much higher rate in the short than in the long term. As the future gets closer, individuals display
reversals of preferences. This behaviour has been formalized through a (quasi) hyperbolic time discounting
function.
Individuals also display myopia, i.e. a lack of foresight. Future (and past) pleasure is valued on a
diminished scale compared to present pleasure. This is because, the further into the future an event, the
more imprecisely the agent is able to estimate the utility she derives from it. The model of myopia predicts
reversals of preferences similar to the ones predicted by theories of present bias. Myopia is therefore able
to explain why individuals are extremely short-sighted when their decisions have environmental
consequences. The future receives very little weight, not because individuals do not care about the
environment, but because of the high uncertainty regarding the future utility derived from undertaking
pro-environmental behaviours. The tendency to be short-sighted often leads to procrastination.
A test on the impacts of present bias and myopia on energy use is provided by Harding and Hsiaw
(2014). The authors find that present-biased agents consume more electricity than consumers who are not
present-biased before joining a goal setting program. Bradford et al. (2014) find that present-biased
individuals are less likely to have a car with high fuel economy, live in a well-insulated residence and more
likely to keep their homes cooler in summer. On the contrary, they report that present bias is not
statistically significant correlated to willingness-to-pay for compact fluorescent lightbulbs. This last finding
is in agreement with Allcott and Taubinsky (2015), where consumers with present bias do not have lower
demand for compact fluorescent lightbulbs.
Another individual behaviour that has implications for energy efficient choices is the status quo
bias, also called the endowment effect. Agents tend to stick to the default setting and display preferences
for the current state. Decisions are postponed and this confers inertia to the decision process. 6 Moreover,
the status quo and the default option tend to be favoured because individuals display an anchoring bias,

5

On the contrary, time preferences discussed in Section 2.1.1 indicate whether a person has a high or low discount
rate.
6
According to Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), there are three main explanations for the status quo bias: transition
costs and/or uncertainty; cognitive misperceptions; psychological commitment stemming from misperceived sunk
costs, regret avoidance, or a drive for consistency.
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whereby any arbitrary framing, such as a number, received before making a decision, tends to bias the
answers towards this initial anchoring point (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
Ek and Söderholm (2010) suggest a strong presence of inertia in household decision-making
concerning electricity use. Brennan (2007) as well observed reluctance to switch from an incumbent
electricity supplier to an entrant. The status quo bias can be reinforced by uncertainty. Alberini et al. (2013)
report that individuals tend to prefer the status quo of no renovation in case of future energy-price
uncertainty.
In many circumstances it is difficult to distinguish the implications of one behavioural factor from
another. For example, there is evidence that consumers value future savings less than the initial investment
costs (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006) but this may be due to both inattention and loss aversion. Savings occurring
in the future are undervalued because they are less salient, and this due to rational inattention. It could
also be that investment costs are evaluated as a loss and are weighted more than gains, because of
reference dependence. Moreover, both rational inattention and myopia can explain why consumers
undervalue changes in energy costs that will occur in the future, or do not consider (future) fuel costs when
choosing between vehicles. 7
2.2 External barriers and adoption or energy use
According to Schleich et al. (2016), external barriers are factors external to the decision maker and mainly
depend on institutional settings. For this reason they are also called “market failure explanations”
(Gerarden et al., 2017). While an extensive literature has discussed the different sources of external
barriers and has agreed that these factors potentially inhibit adoption, there is still room to discuss the
exact effects of these barriers on energy efficient behaviour.
Table 2: External Barriers to energy efficiency
External Barriers
Capital market failures

Information problems
- Lack of Information
- Asymmetric Information and
split incentives

Financial and technological risks

Source: Schleich et al. (2016)

Table 2 reports the different sources of external barriers. One is capital market failures, such as liquidity
constraints, as some agents do not have access to capital to invest in energy efficiency technologies (Berry,
1984; Gillingham et al., 2009). When owners need to rely on capital markets to finance costly investment
and if those markets do not function efficiently, then credit constraints may limit adoption. This happens
even if expected future savings are higher than the costs. Palmer et al. (2012) document that lenders may
not offer loans for energy efficiency investments because of credit risk, high transaction costs, and
asymmetric information.

7

For this reason, the papers that find evidence of rational inattention, provide also evidence of myopia (Busse et al.,
2013; Allcott and Wozny, 2014).
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Another external barrier is represented by information problems. If consumers lack information on
product availability and energy efficient attributes, such as potential savings, they tend to invest less in
energy efficiency technologies. To test the importance of lack of information on investment and energy
use, the existing literature has analysed if a policy intervention, such as the provision of information, has
any impact on consumer choice. Except for few contributions (Filippini et al., 2014; Allcott and Sweeney,
2016; Allcott and Greenstone, 2017), the empirical findings confirm that lack of relevant information leads
to underinvestment in energy efficiency (Kallbekken et al., 2013; Newell and Siikamäki, 2014; Allcott and
Taubinsky, 2015; Davis and Metcalf, 2016; Houde, 2017).
Not only lack of information, but also asymmetric information combined with split incentives
between a principal (for example the landlord) and an agent (tenant) represent barriers to energy
efficiency. It is difficult and expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is doing. An actor may be
unconvinced about the energy efficient attributes of a product or a house. Moreover, the principal and the
agent have conflicting goals, preferences and incentives.
Given asymmetric information and split incentives, the literature has reached some robust
conclusions. First, the ownership status of a house influences investment in profitable energy efficiency
technologies. Gillingham et al. (2012) report that owner-occupied dwellings are more likely to be insulated
in the wall and ceiling compared to rented dwellings. Phillips (2012) reports that landlords have a much
lower willingness to pay for improved insulation compared to owner-occupiers of private residential
dwellings. Krishnamurthy and Kristrom (2015) find that owners are substantially more likely to have access
to highly efficient appliances, such as top-rated energy efficient washing machines and refrigerators, and to
better insulation as well as to heat thermostats. Similarly, Davis (2010) finds that renters are less likely to
purchase energy efficient durables such as refrigerators, clothes washers, and dishwashers. On the
contrary, Mills and Schleich (2010) find that renting compared to owning the residence does not
significantly influence the adoption of energy-saving compact fluorescent lamps.
Second, energy efficiency investment also depends on the type of payment regime between the
landlord and the tenant. Myers (2015) finds that landlords in utility-included apartments are more likely to
invest in conversion from inefficient oil heating to more efficient natural gas heating, compared to
landlords who do not pay for energy. The authors calculate that around 9% of tenant-pay oil houses do not
convert to natural gas due to asymmetric information and this implies lost savings in heating fuel
expenditure of around 12-24%. Energy efficiency is costly to observe and prospective tenants may not be
willing to pay higher rents for higher efficiency that they are not aware of or unconvinced. Papineau (2013)
however finds that energy efficient yet unlabelled buildings, constructed under an energy code, are
associated with significant rent and selling price premiums. This finding is consistent with little asymmetric
information.
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Third, the type of payment regimes also impacts energy use. In particular, utility-included rents
contribute to lower effort in energy conservation of tenants. Elinder et al. (2017) report that households
who were subject to a change from having electricity consumption-included rents to having to pay the
market price for their consumption, reduced consumption by 25 percent. Maruejols and Young (2011) find
that tenants living in utility-included apartments opt for increased thermal comfort. Levinson and Niemann
(2004) as well find that tenants who do not pay directly for their heat set their thermostats at a higher
temperature and this produces an increase in fuel expenditures borne by the landlord. They also find that
the higher costs of the energy used do not translate in proportionally higher rents compared to metered
apartments. This finding supports the hypothesis of information asymmetries. Landlords value the utilityincluded contract more than the cost of the extra energy, because they can use this type of contracts as a
means to attract renters, given that they cannot credibly communicate the energy-efficiency of the
apartment.
As a third external barrier to energy efficiency, Schleich et al. (2016) consider financial and
technological risks. Technology performance for example influences the profitability of an investment and
the survival of a business, and this in turn affects adoption. Moreover, energy efficiency investments own a
certain degree of risks because of the uncertainty related to the actual as compared to the expected energy
savings. Risks are also connected to the fluctuations in fuel prices and to the irreversibility of the
investment. Anderson and Newell (2004) confirm that firms fail to undertake profitable investments
recommended after an energy audit because of risks, along with information barriers.
As in the case of the different behavioural anomalies, the distinction between external and internal
barriers is often more theoretical than practical. In many circumstances it is difficult to disentangle one
barrier from the other. For example, lack of information can be the consequence of inattention or
constraints in assessing available information. At the same time, it is classified as an external barrier to
energy efficiency if it results from an effective discrepancy between the information available to the agents
involved in a transaction. Newell and Siikamäki (2014) is one of the few attempts to disentangle the effect
of imperfect information from alternative explanations linked to consumer behaviour, such as not constant
discounting. The authors find that lack of relevant information is the most important constraint to costeffective energy-efficiency decisions. Additional research is needed to better disentangle behavioural
effects from market failures and evaluate the ability of practicable policies to address these behavioural
effects on energy efficiency.
3. Policy Interventions
Policies and interventions are introduced to overcome external and internal barriers. However, a broadly
held view is that a substantial portion of the potential benefits of energy efficiency is still uncaptured, as
the effectiveness of policies can be improved. The objective of this section is to present the existing policies
and interventions, relate them to the specific barrier and discuss their effectiveness.
12
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Three types of policy instruments have been used to influence energy efficiency by addressing both
internal and external barriers. Information-based instruments, regulatory instruments and economic and
financial programs.
Informational instruments are intended to influence consumers’ behaviour by disclosing crucial
information about potential savings for example, through energy audits, labelling, energy performance
certificates and information campaigns. Within this group of instruments are included persuasion strategies
also called “nudges”, which represent well-crafted interventions that provide for example feedback, peer
comparisons, injunctive norms, or that manipulate the default setting and the information metrics.
Regulatory instruments, such as energy efficiency standards, define enforceable actions aimed at
meeting specific environmental quality targets or performance standards. Efficiency standards often
translate into minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) that all covered products must meet.
Products that do not satisfy such standards are removed from the market.
Finally, economic and financial programs provide monetary incentives for energy efficiency such as
grants and loan facilities, subsidies, tax deduction, tax credits, rebates and guarantees. Grants and loan
facilities, such as loan offered at subsidized interest rate, aim at facilitating access to capital for energyefficient investments. Rebates, tax credits and tax deductions encourage energy efficiency actions by
reducing the cost to make the investments. Taxes are also a financial instrument that contributes to energy
efficiency by increasing the relative prices of less efficient products. Table 3 provides a correspondence
between the different barriers and policy options available.
3.1 Provision of Information
Information programs can be divided into two broad categories. On the one hand energy audit, product
labelling, energy performance certificates, feedback and hard information interventions disclose energy
saving information and benefits related to energy-efficient appliances and investments. On the other hand,
peer comparison, goal setting, default setting, focus on losses, manipulation of the metric and the scale,
translation of the metrics, that are classified as “nudges”, act as low cost motivational and persuasion
strategies. To design this second type of interventions, increased guidance from psychologists and
behavioural scientists is called for.
Almost all the information programs listed above not only help to overcome information barriers,
but also address many behavioural barriers to energy efficiency. By guiding consumers in the decision
process, they lower the cognitive costs of energy decision-making and address bounded rationality.
Moreover, information programs that provide feedback on own energy consumption are designed to
address rational inattention because they make consumers aware of their consumption and potential
impacts. To address bounded rationality, feedback can also focus on peer comparison through information
on neighbours’ energy consumption. Goal setting and commitment programs are nudging tools that intend
to address high temporal discounting, present bias and reference dependence. Programs which change
13
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the default setting address the status quo bias. Messages that focus on losses instead of gains should
tackle reference dependence. Messages that make future returns less uncertain can address risk
preferences. Moral suasion tools can be designed to leverage pro-environmental preferences.
Manipulation of the metric and the scale in the case of fuel economy helps addressing bounded rationality.
Bounded rationality is also addressed by providing multiple translations of energy-efficiency metrics.
Table 3: Policy options to address the specific barrier to energy efficiency
Barriers
Time Preferences
Risk Preferences

Environmental Preferences
Reference Dependent Preference and
non-linear probability weighting
Bounded Rationality

Rational Inattention
Present Bias and myopia
Status Quo Bias
Capital market failures
Information problems

Financial and technological risks

Policy option
Commitment and goal setting programs
Grants and loan facilities, subsidies, tax deduction, tax
credits, rebates, guarantees, loss-framed messages,
pricing programs characterized by lower spread of
charges
Messages framed in terms of intrinsic goals, moral
suasion and appeal to intrinsic values
Subsidies, tax credits, loss-framed messages,
commitment and goal setting programs, pricing
programs characterized by lower spread of charges
Standards, energy performance certificates, subsidies,
tax credits, rebates, loans, taxes, energy audits,
product labelling, feedback, vivid signals such as
thermal images, peer-comparison, information
metrics and scales that match the problem-solving,
provision of multiple translations of energy-efficiency
metrics
Standards, energy performance certificates, subsidies,
tax credits, rebates, loans, taxes, energy audits,
product labelling, feedback
Standards, energy performance certificates, subsidies,
tax credits, rebates, loans, taxes, commitment and
goal setting programs
Set the default option that favours energy
conservation to opt-out rather than opt-in
Grants and loan facilities, subsidies, tax deduction, tax
credits, rebates, guarantees
Standards, energy performance certificates, grants
and loan facilities, subsidies, tax deduction, tax
credits, rebates, guarantees, energy audits, product
labelling, feedback
Guarantees on energy efficiency investments

Information programs are a purely informational tool and the realization of energy efficiency gains
crucially depends on a follow-up action. For example, audits are tailored and highly personalized
information and consist in recommendations for attic insulation, sealing of windows and doors, lighting,
heating and cooling improvements and replacement of appliances. They can improve energy efficiency
because homeowners may not be aware that their homes are inefficient and choose to follow some of the
recommendations of the auditors. Moreover, by providing information to tenants, energy audits can help
alleviating the information asymmetries between landlords and tenants.
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Frondel and Vance (2013) analyse the effect of home energy audits on investment in home
renovations and find that on average audits increase energy efficiency investments. However, the authors
find strong heterogeneous responses, with some households investing less as a result of the energy audit.
Taking advantage of coaching from auditors, some households may have decided to reduce energy use
through behavioural changes rather than retrofitting investments. Alberini and Towe (2015), for example
find that participation in the home energy audit program reduces energy use. However, Allcott and
Greenstone (2017) report that the benefits of auditing are inferior to costs.
A growing number of studies have analysed the impact of hard information interventions which
disclose energy saving information of products, through for example energy labelling. 8 The evidence is
mixed, and eventually depends on the empirical approach adopted, with some papers using artefactual
field experiments and other natural field experiments. 9 Ward et al. (2011) apply a contingent choice
experiment and confirm a positive influence of Energy Star label on consumer preferences for refrigerators.
Houde (2017) uses a quasi-experimental approach and finds that consumers rely on Energy Star label when
purchasing refrigerators. However, some consumers over-rely on the binary label which acts as a substitute
for more accurate, but complex, energy information such as actual energy savings.
Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) apply both approaches and analyse the impact of a program that
provides consumers with information about cost savings from compact fluorescent lightbulbs compared to
incandescent ones. While in the artefactual field experiment they find that information provision increases
the market for efficient lightbulbs, they find no effect of information disclosure in the natural field
experiment. Allcott and Sweeney (2016) find that information provided by sales agents about energy
savings and customer rebates is ineffective at increasing demand for energy efficient products. In Allcott
and Greenstone (2017), hard information on the private and social benefits of investments that could
followup a home energy audit did not influence the participation in the audit program. In this analysis only
price interventions, in the form of audit subsidies, increased the take-up of the program. Kallbekken et al.
(2013) test the effect of providing information which makes lifetime operating costs more salient to
consumers at the point of purchase as well as training of sales staff. Combining information and training
treatments leads consumers to purchasing more energy-efficient tumble driers but no effect on fridgefreezers sales.
While artefactual field experiments suggest that the provision of information improves energy
efficient choices, natural field experiments seem to indicate that imperfect information and inattention are
a minimal barrier to energy efficiency. In these last papers, a large share of consumers might still prefer
energy inefficient products even after being powerfully informed. Consumers make an informed decision
8

The US has adopted the Energy Star Program; in Europe the Regulation (EU) 2017/1369 of the European Parliament
provides a framework for energy labelling that repeals the Directive 2010/30/EU.
9
Choice experiments and computer-based experiments are artefactual field experiments because they do observe
behaviour in an artefactual environment, as opposed to a naturally occurring environment.
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not to purchase the energy efficient products. It should be noted however that in natural field experiments,
the (store) environment provides the control group with information on different energy efficiency
technologies, including electricity use. The availability of this information to the control group may have
reduced the effectiveness of the information treatment.
A second important aspect when testing the effectiveness of information programs is the way in
which the information is presented. Heinzle (2012) assesses the importance of timeframe and format in
which information about energy consumption is presented. The author concludes that framing information
in terms of operating cost rather than physical measurement, such as “watts,” is more effective in
influencing consumer behaviour but only if the information is presented over the lifetime of the product.
Davis and Metcalf (2016) find that labels enhanced with local electricity costs information lead to more
energy efficient choices. Tailored energy labels produce larger gains than non-tailored ones. Newell and
Siikamäki (2014) conclude that information content and label style strongly influence the valuation of water
heaters. In particular, they compare various elements of information labels and find that the economic
value of energy saving is the most effective piece of information for energy efficient decisions.
Some information interventions aim at providing easily accessible feedback on the quantity of
energy used through various technological means, such as in-home monitors, computers, mobile phones
and/or other portable displays. A large number of rigorous studies exists on the effects of feedbacks. These
studies confirm the positive correlation between the feedback and energy conservation. Meta analyses
have been also used to assess if feedback works (Fischer, 2008; McKerracher and Torriti, 2013) and which
factors moderate their effectiveness. Karlin et al. (2015) review 42 articles published between 1976 and
2010 and conclude that feedback has a positive effect on energy conservation. Its effectiveness is
maximized if the feedback is delivered via computer, if the feedback duration is either less than three
months or more than a year and if the feedback is combined with a goal intervention. Some recent studies
analysed the mechanisms behind the effectiveness of feedbacks and conclude that in-home-displays help
consumers improve the decision making process in case of high-prices, whereas they are less likely to make
prices more salient (Jessoe and Rapson, 2014; Lynham et al., 2016).
Interestingly, Goodhew et al. (2015) find that thermal images of heat losses in homes motivate
households to reduce energy use and take energy-saving measures more than a carbon footprint audit.
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) report that proving simple but vivid signal of energy consumption through light
bulbs that change colour at different energy prices are effective in reducing energy consumption. Given
that people rely on a simple counting heuristic, vivid signals as well as interventions that make one recall
energy saving actions that are easily available in memories are effective because they provide information
which is easy to process (Frederiks et al., 2015).
Feedback programs that provide descriptive normative messages through peer comparison have
been used to encourage energy conservation. This is because social norms can effectively induce
16
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behavioural change (Schultz et al., 2007). Conforming to social norms is sometimes a mental shortcut that
people use to address complexity in decision making. For this reason descriptive normative messages can
address bounded rationality. Comparative feedbacks can induce energy conservation because they evoke
social comparison and social pressure but also because they make salient a social norm in favour of energy
conservation. To avoid boomerang effects, whereby households with below average use respond by
increasing consumption, these conservation programs also employ injunctive norms which convey social
approval through “smiley faces” or “thumbs-up”.
Schultz et al. (2007), Ayres et al. (2012) and Costa and Kahn (2013) find that this type of
intervention is successful in reducing residential energy use. However, Allcott and Rogers (2014) report that
the effort in reducing electricity is not persistent and decays after some time. They document a pattern of
action and backsliding, in which, after an initial reaction, consumers forget about the report and return to
baseline consumption. In this respect, the report does not act by providing information but by drawing
attention to energy use. Allcott (2011b) as well confirms that consumers react to the report not because
their knowledge increases, but because the report increases the moral cost of energy use. A meta-analysis
of 30 different studies published between 1976 and 2013 concludes that peer comparison is less powerful
than other social influence interventions, because it delivers the feedback in a fairly anonymous way
(Abrahamse and Steg, 2013). The most effective interventions are those where information is provided by
block leaders, who are persons belonging to the same social network and make use of face-to-face
interactions.
Commitment is another important nudge whereby people make a pledge or promise to engage in
sustainable energy behaviour. This program should reduce impulsivity and encourage investments that
have immediate and larger costs but delayed rewards. A similar strategy is goal setting, which entails giving
consumers a specific reference point, for instance to save energy by a certain amount. In this respect, goal
setting programs address reference-dependent preferences. Harding and Hsiaw (2014) document that
people voluntarily enrol in the goal program, setting personal conservation goals. The paper also finds that
a goal setting program, which offers a menu of energy savings options with respect to annual electricity
savings, attracts present-biased consumers and consumers with limited self-control. These consumers are
aware of their need for a commitment to behave pro-environmentally. With no commitment, they will
consume more electricity than ex ante preferred. The authors report substantial and persistent energy
conservation among consumers who commit to realistic goals, but no savings among consumers who
choose very low or unrealistically high goals. Becker (1978) as well finds that too easy goals to reduce
electricity are not effective. On the contrary households who had been given a relatively difficult goal in
combination with a feedback performed better. Goal setting proves to be effective in particular in
combination with tailored feedback (McCalley and Midden, 2002; Abrahamse et al., 2007).
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Given that people tend to stick to the status quo, the use of default setting that favours energy
conservation could be an important nudge to promote pro-environmental behaviour. The default option to
participate in pro-environmental programs can be set to opt-out rather than opt-in. Pichert and
Katsikopoulos (2008) find that people are more likely to choose a green source of energy if the green
option is presented as the default. McCalley (2006) finds that removing the default temperature settings
from washing machines brings to significant energy saving, as users set lower washing temperatures using
an anchor point of zero temperature. Brown et al. (2013) report that manipulating the default settings on
office thermostats reduces the chosen temperature.
One intervention that can be effective in addressing loss aversion is the use of loss-framed rather
than gain-framed messages. A message should focus on the costs of the less efficient behaviour rather than
the benefits of the most efficient one. This manipulation makes the loss more salient, memorable and
motivating (Frederiks et al., 2015). Dütschke and Paetz (2013) find that loss aversion has implications for
energy tariff configurations. In their study, consumers prefer pricing programs characterized by lower
spread of charges, so that they can avoid the risk of too high bills. While in the health domain the research
on framing has reached some stable conclusions, findings in the environmental contexts have been less
consistent. More research is needed on the empirical examination of the effectiveness of loss-versus gainframing in the energy efficiency domain.
Manipulation of the information metrics can address bounded rationality. For example,
information metrics that match the problem-solving processes have the greatest influence on consumer
preferences and choices. This is because the decision making is less effortful if the problem representation
matches the problem-solving processes. Camilleri and Larrick (2014) find that simply manipulating the
metric (consumption of gas versus the cost of gas) and the scale (100 miles versus 15,000 miles versus
100,000 miles) on which fuel economy information is expressed, would shift preferences toward more fuelefficient vehicles. Ungemach et al. (2017) find that providing multiple translations of energy-efficiency
metrics could help guiding consumer behaviour.
The way a message is framed proves to be important in light of the different degrees of
environmental preferences. Pelletier and Sharp (2008) report the importance of framing messages in
terms of whether they serve intrinsic goals (i.e., health, well-being) rather than extrinsic goals (i.e., make or
save money, comfort) in order to increase the level of self-determined motivation and thus induce proenvironmental behaviour. Information programs, even if they are designed to increase knowledge and
awareness in general,

tend to encourage behavioural change among people who strongly endorse

biospheric (environmental) values. Information is effective when it resonates with people’s central values
(Steg et al., 2015). Targeted policy interventions are therefore crucial in this context as well. Given that
informational interventions are perhaps ineffective in those who care less about the environment, they
should be directed towards those who strongly care about the environment. This is because they make
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consumers more inclined to act on their values. Taufik et al., (2016) find that the intention to act proenvironmentally is largely driven by the positive feeling about acting pro-environmentally and less so by the
perceived benefits connected to this action. Therefore, to induce pro-environmental behaviour,
information campaigns should stress the selfless, societal aspects of acting pro-environmentally and should
resonate with people’s feelings, instead of exclusively appealing to their calculations.
3.2 Regulatory instruments
Standards are an important tool to improve energy efficiency because they lead to a ban on certain classes
of products which do not meet certain efficiency standards. They can also impose stricter requirements for
heating and cooling systems and for housing envelopes. By removing energy-inefficient products from the
market, regulatory instruments are designed to address (rational) inattention to operating costs and to
energy savings connected to energy-efficient products, bounded rationality and present bias, in particular
lack of self-control. Moreover regulatory instruments such as standards or building codes are also justified
by the presence of imperfect information.
Many papers document that stricter energy standards expedite the transitions towards more
energy-efficient investments (Greening et al., 1997; Davis, 2008; de Melo and Jannuzzi, 2010; Costa and
Kahn, 2010; 2011; Tao and Yu, 2011; Aroonruengsawat et al., 2012; Jacobsen and Kotchen, 2013; Mills and
Schleich, 2014). However, calculations of the energy savings and welfare effects of stricter standards are
often made without taking into account the welfare losses imposed by fewer available choices. Product
standards impose a restriction on product choice and force behavioural change on those who gain little
from energy efficiency. Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) find that imperfect information and rational
inattention alone cannot justify a ban on incandescent lightbulbs. Standards are only a second-best policy
compared to information disclosure programs. The latter directly address information asymmetries and
rational inattention without reducing the available choices. A ban on incandescent lightbulbs produces
welfare losses to consumers who strongly prefer these inefficient lightbulbs even after being informed of
the apparently large cost savings. In the paper, these welfare losses outweigh the gains to uninformed or
inattentive consumers. On the contrary, Tsvetanov and Segerson (2014) acknowledge that stricter
standards on top-freezer refrigerators could make some consumers worse off, but they find that these
instruments are on average welfare improving under a self-control framework, where individuals are
characterized by temptation. This paper indicates how important it is to identify the underlying behavioural
assumption used in evaluating the welfare effects of energy efficiency standards.
Concerns about the use of standards arise also in the context of fuel-economy. In the US, higher
CAFE standards are generally found to be inferior to gasoline taxes in improving energy efficiency. Austin
and Dinan (2005) report that gasoline tax would accumulate savings much earlier than CAFE standards. A
tax not only encourages the purchase of more fuel-efficient vehicles, but it also discourages driving.
Jacobsen (2013) confirms that gasoline taxes are more efficient than CAFE regulation. Moreover, examining
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both the new and used vehicle markets, the author finds that in the long-run, fuel economy standards are
more regressive than expected as they generate larger proportional welfare losses to low-income
households. Fischer et al. (2007) conclude as well that the efficiency rationale for raising fuel economy
standards is weak.
In the context of fuel-economy, the inefficiency of standards is confirmed even in the presence of
some behavioural anomalies. Parry et al. (2014) compare the welfare effects of energy efficiency standards
and pricing policies in the case of misperceptions of energy costs due to rational inattention or bounded
rationality. They conclude that even with large misperceptions, an optimal policy portfolio should make
only a limited use of fuel economy and power sector efficiency standards. Pricing policies should be the first
best option, while efficiency standards can play a role only if practical constraints on gasoline/electricity
taxes arise.
Ito and Sallee (2014) document that “attribute-based” standards generate an additional distortion
to the market. This type of policies is designed conditional on product attributes rather than the target they
wish to achieve. 10 Attribute-based policies tend to provide a less strict standard for products that are larger
and more polluting, thus creating perverse incentives. The authors find that as a consequence of weightbased standards, the Japanese car market has experienced an increase in vehicle weights, and this lowers
fuel economy and increases externalities related to accidents.
To summarize, efficiency standards are an inferior instrument compared to other policies, such as
information programs or taxes, as they do not influence behaviour by discouraging the use of energy-using
products. They also introduce some distortions, reducing the available choice and creating perverse
incentives. Other policies represent a more direct and efficient response to the market failures that
standards tend to address.
3.3 Economic and financial instruments
Economic instruments are an important instrument for energy efficiency as they make investments more
attractive by lowering upfront costs or by changing the relative price compared to less efficient products. In
principle, these incentives apply to actions that are cost-effective from the collective point of view, but
which would not otherwise be undertaken by individuals.
Economic incentives are primarily designed to address capital market failures. Moreover,
Blumstein (2010) reports that some individuals choose to make energy efficiency investments because their
awareness has been raised by the existence of the incentive schemes. In this respect, economic incentives
may address an information problem. If subsidies, grants and loans are given directly to installers, they
reduce information barriers, as installers may have a commercial approach to promoting energy efficiency.
Rebates, tax credits and tax deductions are also particularly relevant for persons who are risk averse.
Finally, subsidies and taxes can address the same type of barriers of standards, in particular present bias,
10

The same problem applies to attribute-based tax and subsidies.
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bounded rationality and rational inattention. This is because in case of present bias and rational
inattention, product subsidies and taxes can divert purchases towards the most efficient appliances. Finally
guarantees address risk preferences as well as financial and technological risks.
Just like standards, product subsidies on efficient products or taxes on inefficient products impose a
relative shadow cost on less efficient products. This shadow cost means that consumers pay relatively less
for more efficient products. While they are designed to overcome a similar barrier, taxes should be
preferable to standards, given that their cost is transparent, they promote behavioural changes, and they
take into consideration the heterogeneity of consumers. Taxes have drawbacks as well. They produce
negative distributional effects and their impact is limited if the price elasticity of energy demand is small.
However, Wagner (2016) finds that environmental preferences shape the effectiveness of relative price and
tax incentives, with environmentalists being less sensitive to changes in prices and taxes than their less
environmental counterparts.
The literature suggests that if there are no behavioural anomalies, the social optimum is to apply a
Pigouvian tax or equivalent instruments (Gillingham and Palmer, 2014). For example, Galarraga et al. (2016)
find that in Spain a tax scheme on dishwashers, refrigerators and washing ensures greater energy savings
than a subsidy scheme. In the presence of behavioural anomalies, however, subsidies for energy efficiency
investments represent the optimal policy option. Hassett and Metcalf (1995) report that subsidies are much
more effective than an equivalent tax in particular in the presence of loss aversion and reference
dependence. People strongly prefer avoiding losses to achieving gains, and a subsidy tends to reduce the
loss (represented by the cost of the investment) rather than increase the gains (because of lower operating
costs due to lower use). Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) as well report that a moderate subsidy could be
optimal to increase the market for compact fluorescent lightbulbs in case of imperfect information and
inattention. Allcott et al. (2014) report that, if consumers undervalue energy costs because of rational
inattention or imperfect information, the optimal combination of tax and subsidy implies a quite large
product subsidy. A subsidy is more effective than a tax in targeting the most biased consumer, because
consumers who undervalue energy costs the most are also the least sensitive to the energy tax. As a
general rule, targeting the corrective measures to the different groups of consumers is crucial to achieving
the highest energy conservation. From a welfare perspective, what matters is whether the consumers
affected by the distortions are also affected by the policy interventions. If, from an institutional point of
view, the eligibility of subsidies cannot be restricted to a specific group, targeted marketing at the groups
most affected by the distortion could produce large gains (Allcott et al., 2015).
There are important concerns however with subsidies, tax deduction, tax credits and rebates. First,
the literature has found that these policy instruments are associated with a rebound effect (Alberini et al.,
2016), whereby potential savings are wiped out by changes in people's behaviour. Second, they encourage
free-riding (Houde and Aldy, 2017). Third they need to be financed through, for example, distortionary
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taxes and finally they are often not cost-effective. Davis et al. (2014) evaluate a subsidy programme to
replace inefficient refrigerators and air conditioners with new models and conclude that the programme is
not cost-effective. Boomhower and Davis (2014) as well report that large subsidies are not cost-effective as
most households in their analysis would have participated even with much lower subsidy. Datta and Gulati
(2014) find that rebates affect only the demand of energy star clothes washers and not of dishwasher and
refrigerator. A meta-analysis of 42 utility conservation programs in the residential, commercial, and
industrial sectors found that actual energy-saving estimates for residential retrofit programs are lower than
engineering-economic estimates (Nadel and Keating, 1991). Allcott and Greenstone (2017) analyse the
impact of an energy efficiency program, which subsidizes a home energy audit and subsequent
recommended investments. They find that the marginal investment probabilities decrease sharply as the
subsidy increases. While the subsidy induces additional households to audit, these marginal households are
less and less interested in making subsequent investments. This implies a negative social welfare induced
by the program. The benefit from reduced energy does not compensate for the reduction in consumer
utility, due to the higher taxes required to finance the program. However, they also conclude that
subsidizing energy conservation remains an important means to improve energy efficiency. In their
analysis, the market for home energy audits and retrofits would almost entirely disappear in the absence of
government intervention.
Finally, the use of guarantees, whereby governments or energy providers share the costs and risks
but also the benefits from future savings related to energy efficient renovations, can improve energy
efficiency by reducing the perceived risk of the investment (Fischbacher et al., 2015).
Meta-analyses have been conducted to compare the performance of information and noninformation interventions. For example, Abrahamse et al. (2005) review 38 different articles dating from
1977 to 2004 and conclude that information programs increase knowledge but this does not necessarily
translate into behavioural changes or energy savings. Monetary rewards are successful in engaging
consumers in energy conservation, but the effect is not persistent in time. Commitment programs have
long-term effects and are more effective when made in public rather than private. Finally feedback reduces
energy use in particular if it is provided frequently, through continuous electronic feedback for instance.
Delmas et al. (2013) present the most comprehensive meta-analysis of different types of interventions.
These include feedback, energy savings tips, energy audits, financial incentives and peer comparisons. The
authors report that real time feedback and home energy audits are drivers of conservation behaviour,
while low level information strategies, such as energy savings tips and individual usage feedback are not.
Peer comparisons do not produce energy savings, but this may be due to the fact that feedback proves to
be effective if delivered in real time, and none of the studies in the meta-analysis considered real time peer
comparisons. Social influence is maximized in face-to-face interactions, while social comparison

22
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1233

24

Cattaneo: Internal and External Barriers to Energy Efficiency: Made-to

interventions generally happen anonymously (Abrahamse and Steg, 2013). Finally, in this analysis, nonmonetary, information-based strategies are superior to economic incentives.
Gneezy et al. (2011) report that financial benefits from saving energy are often limited and thus
provide fewer incentives to conservation. Ito et al. (2015) compare the effects of appealing to intrinsic
versus extrinsic motivations. The authors find that both moral suasion and economic incentives induce the
desired conservative effects, but while the former exerts diminishing effects, the latter produces persistent
effects, leading to habit formation.
Appealing to economic rather than biospheric concerns not only could be ineffective in securing
behaviour change, but also counterproductive. Extrinsic rewards can sometimes crowd out’ intrinsic
motivation to act pro-environmentally and consequently backfire and discourage the pro-environmental
behaviour they are meant to encourage (Schwartz et al., 2015).
4. Summary and conclusions
Various barriers to the adoption of energy efficiency technologies have been identified. Some are classified
as internal and other as external barriers. Internal barriers have to do with factors which cannot be
changed or are difficult to change because they are related to preferences and predictable (ir)rational
behaviour. On the contrary, external barriers capture underlying factors that limit the adoption of energy
efficiency technologies but can be easily changed. Policy instruments have been introduced to address both
types of barriers. Policy instruments are classified as regulatory instruments, economic and financial
programs and information-based instruments. By assessing the effectiveness of the different types of
policies against the barriers they aim to address, this paper is able to provide seven solid conclusions.
First, feedback is an effective way to influence behaviour related to energy use, in particular if the
feedback is delivered via computer, if the feedback duration is either less than three months or more than
a year and if the feedback is combined with a goal intervention. While real time feedback induces energy
conservation, a simple feedback on individual energy usage is not enough to influence behaviour. Feedback
provided by vivid information, such as thermal images of heat losses, largely motivates households to
reduce energy use. Moreover, feedback that provides peer comparison on energy use encourages energy
conservation. There are other social influence approaches, such as interventions where the information is
provided by block leaders, that prove to be effective because they deliver the feedback less anonymously.
Second, audits improve energy efficiency because they increase awareness of possible
improvements but their benefits are found to be inferior to their costs imposed to the community.
Third, motivational and persuasion strategies such as commitment and goals setting, default
options that favour energy conservation, loss-framed messages, messages framed in terms of intrinsic goals
and moral suasion are very effective in addressing the relevant bias and induce energy conservation.
Fourth, evidence regarding information programs such as product labelling is mixed and depends
on the methodology used for the analysis. More research is needed to fully understand if labelling really
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improves energy efficient choices. Moreover, the effectiveness of the information programs is affected by
the way in which the information is presented, with the timeframe, format and metrics being strong
moderators of the effectiveness of this type of interventions.
Fifth, standards, information programs, subsidies and taxes are directed to the same types of
market failures. However, standards are an inferior instrument compared to the other interventions
because they do not influence behaviour by reducing the use of energy-using products and generate a
welfare loss by limiting the available choices. Information programs, subsidies and taxes should be
preferred because they represent a more direct and efficient response to the targeted market failures.
Sixth, taxes are a good solution because they are transparent, promote behavioural changes and
take into consideration the heterogeneity of consumers. However they give rise to negative distributional
effects. Moreover, in case of reference dependence, subsidies and tax credits are better than taxes. This is
because people strongly prefer avoiding losses to achieving gains. The limitation of subsidies is that they
produce a rebound effect, encourage free-riding and need a source of financing.
Finally, a crucial point emerging from this review is the importance of targeting the policies. For
example, policies should target investments that are less conspicuous in place of those that confer a status
benefit. People in search of social approval are willing to invest in the latter without any policy intervention.
Moreover, while some interventions are ineffective among those who care less about the environment,
they could still deliver substantial benefits if targeted towards those who strongly care about the
environment. This is because they make them more inclined to act on their values. When the policy itself
cannot be targeted, once can think of targeting a marketing campaign. For example, subsidies cannot be
restricted to a specific group, but a marketing campaign can target the consumers that are mostly affected
by the distortion that the subsidy aims to address.
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